Not only does not rely on purchasing objectives address China`s problematic policy, which harms Americans, but it also helps to consolidate government planning, contrary to market results. In particular, because China continues to impose discriminatory retaliatory duties on U.S. exporters, only its state-owned enterprises, not the Chinese private sector, will increase many purchases to meet their commitments, the opposite of what U.S. politicians say they want. The objectives of the agreement also send signals to America`s allies that the United States is primarily interested in China diverting imports from its suppliers, rather than attacking China`s problematic policies and undermining their confidence in U.S. policy. The United States and China have reached a historic and binding agreement on a first-phase trade agreement, which requires structural reforms and other changes to China`s economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, currency and currencies. The Phase One agreement also provides for China to make significant additional purchases of goods and services in the United States in the coming years. It is important that the agreement creates a robust dispute resolution system that ensures timely and effective implementation and implementation.
The United States has agreed to substantially amend its customs measures in accordance with Section 301. The agreement also contains obligations, at least on paper, to stop the forced transfer of U.S. technology to Chinese competitors. Companies have long complained about having to issue valuable business secrets and technologies to do business in China. China has pledged not to require such transfers, even if companies apply for certain government licenses or authorizations. One of the centerpieces of the agreement is China`s commitment to purchase at least $200 billion in additional U.S. goods and services over the next two years. Among the $200 billion in additional purchases, it should be noted that while the agreement is seen as a win-win situation for both countries, the private sector may not yet be easy.
Companies on both sides have experienced two years of instability to push them to expand their businesses, find new suppliers and sell them in more diversified markets or focus on the Chinese market itself. All these obstacles and complications lead to political failure. Regardless of who is president, the United States must get China to liberalize its tariffs, reduce non-tariff barriers, and streamline its subsidies and other practices that distort economic incentives. In response to Trump`s trade war, China imposed additional tariffs on more than 50 percent of U.S. exports in 2018 and 2019. It is mysterious that the legal text of the first phase of the agreement did not remove, reduce or even mention the word “tariffs,” and it did little to address the major trade problems that the United States has with China. Instead, the Trump administration has provided an excellent case study on why simple purchase commitments can`t go around. Recognising the importance of their agricultural sectors, ensuring a safe and reliable supply of food and agricultural products, and supporting the demand for food and agricultural products from the peoples of both countries, [the contracting parties] intend to intensify agricultural cooperation, expand the market for food and agricultural products in each part and promote the growth of food and agricultural trade.